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Abstract: Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the 
same rent seeking behavior as documented in the “curse of natural resources” literature. In this 
paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using data for 108 recipient countries in 
the period 1960 to 1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on democracy. In particular, 
if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of five years reaches the 75
th 
percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is reduced between 0.6 and one point, 
a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the effect of oil rents on political institutions. The 
fall in democracy if oil revenues reach the 75
th percentile is smaller, (0.02). Aid is a bigger curse 
than oil. 
 
JEL:  O11, O19, O16 
Keywords: foreign aid, democracy, conditionality. 
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1. Introduction 
Many studies have shown a negative correlation between economic growth and natural resources, a 
finding often dubbed “the curse of natural resources.”  However, oil and other minerals may not be 
the biggest curse in developing countries. In many of them, the amount of foreign aid is a far larger 
share of government revenues. In Burkina Faso, for example, aid accounted for two-thirds of the 
government budget and 8% of GDP over the period 1985-89. In Mauritania, it accounted for 60% 
and 22%, respectively, for the period 1980-84. In Rwanda, Vanuatu, Gambia, Niger, Tonga and 
Mali, foreign donors provided over a third of the government budget during some 5 -year p eriods 
between 1960 and 1999. Some countries are chronically dependent on aid. Aid accounted for 40% 
of the government budget and 6.2% of GDP in Burkina Faso during 1960-1999. In Mauritania, for 
37% and 12%, respectively. 
 
A recent empirical literature has investigated the role of institutions on development. Mauro (1995, 
1998), Knack and Keefer (1999), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Easterly 
and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Rodrik (2004), among others, show a positive 
relationship between good institutions and development.  The literature on political institutions and 
growth is less developed. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004) find strong effects of democracy on 
growth. Persson (2004) shows that the form of democracy, rather than democracy versus non-
democracy has important consequences for the adoption of structural policies that promote growth. 
Barro (1991) and Glaeser et al (forthcoming) find weaker effect of political institutions on growth.  
 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between aid and political institutions.
2 One view of this 
relationship suggests that aid is needed to advance democratic institutions in developing countries. 
In the words of Boutros Boutros Ghali: “ We must help states to change certain mentalities and 
persuade them to embark on a process of structural reform. The United Nations must be able to 
provide them with technical assistance enabling them to adapt institutions as necessary, to educate 
their citizens, to train officials and to elaborate regulatory systems designed to uphold democracy 
and the respect for human rights.” A second view holds that foreign aid could leads politicians in 
power to engage in rent-seeking activities in order to appropriate these resources and try to exclude 
                                                  
2 This paper is related to the recent work on aid and growth. See Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) for a 
summary of the previous literature.   3 
other groups from the political process. By doing so political institutions are damaged because they 
became less democratic and less representative.  
 
Our findings support the second view. Foreign aid damages the political institutions of the country 
by reducing democratic rules. The magnitudes are striking. If the average share of foreign aid over 
GDP in a country were 1.9% over the period 1960-1999, then the recipient country would have 
gone from the average level of democracy in recipient countries in the initial year to a total absence 
of democratic institutions. Since most foreign aid is not contingent on the democratic level of the 
recipient countries, there is no incentive for governments to keep a good level of checks and 
balances in place. The effect of oil in the long-run is less important: if the average amount of oil 
revenues over GDP is 12.2% over the period, then the recipient country will go from the average 
level of democracy in recipient countries in the initial year to a total absence of democracy.  
 
This is not to say that promoting democracy should be the objective of foreign aid.
3 However, as 
argued in Collier and Dollar (2004), at a minimum donors and international agencies should abide 
by the Hippocratic oath: do no harm.  
 
2. The curse of natural resources and the effect of foreign aid 
 
The curse of natural resources has been documented in several studies. Sachs and Warner (2001) 
show that resource-rich countries grow slower than other countries and that this finding is robust to 
controlling for geography, resource abundance per capita and mineral versus agricultural resources. 
This corroborates previous studies, among them Sachs and Warner (1999) and Auty (1990). Some 
case studies also provide compelling explanation of the relationship  between natural resources and 
civil wars (Ross 2003). 
 
Natural resources and foreign aid share a common characteristic: they can be appropriated by 
corrupt politicians without having to resort to unpopular, and normally less profitable, measures 
like taxation. However, there is less agreement with respect to the economic impact of aid. The 
literature on the effect of aid on growth is mixed. Boone (1996) finds, using a sample of developing 
                                                  
3 Indeed, the constitution of the World Bank prohibits such targeting.   4 
countries, that aid has no effect on investment or growth. Burnside and Dollar (2000) qualify this 
result by including the role of policies: aid has a positive effect on growth in developing countries 
with ''good'' policies while it has no effect when countries follow ''poor'' policies. This latter result 
has been challenged recently by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003), who find the result of 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) sensitive to sample size. Easterly (2003a) points out that the findings in 
Burnside and Dollar (2003) are also sensitive to the definition of foreign aid, policies and output 
per capita.
4 Easterly (2003b) makes a broader argument on why aid frequently fails. 
 
One reason that can justify the small effect of foreign aid on growth is the generation of many rent-
seeking activities. There is a large body of evidence on the rent-seeking activities generated by 
foreign aid. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) analyze using panel data from a unique survey of 
primary school in Uganda, the extent to which the foreign aid for education purposes actually 
reached the schools. They find that during the period 1991-1995 schools on average received only 
13% of the grants received by the government. Moreover they show that other surveys in other 
African countries confirm that Uganda is not a special case. These results provide case studies 
evidence of the rent-seeking activities generated by the reception of foreign aid. In extreme cases 
the extent of the rent seeking activities could lead to a civil conflict. Maren (1997) provides 
evidence that Somalia's civil war was caused by the desire of different factions to control the large 
food aid that the country was receiving.  
 
The economics literature has documented several mechanisms that can explain why sudden 
windfalls of resources in developing countries could lead to a decline in their growth rate. But, how 
about the effect of foreign aid on democracy in recipient countries? Brautigam and Knack (2004) 
have recently summarized some mechanisms that could explain a negative relationship between 
foreign aid and democracy.  “High levels of aid can make it more difficult to solve the collective 
action problems that are inherent in reform efforts, create moral hazards for both recipients and 
donors, perpetuate both a “soft budget constraint” and a “tragedy of the commons” with regards to 
                                                  
4 There have also been some recent theoretical contributions. Tornell and Lane (1999) have demonstrated the 
so called “voracity effect”: if some groups can extract transfers from the government and if there are not 
institutional barriers to discretionary redistribution then a sudden windfall of resources can reduce the 
growth rate of the economy. Svensson (2000) focuses on the deleterious effect of aid in economies with 
powerful social groups.   5 
the future budget, and weaken the development  of local pressures for accountability and reform”. 
Our interest is in the last channel. A large amount of aid can reduce the incentives for democratic 
accountability. When revenues do not depend on the taxes raised from citizens and business, there 
is less incentive for accountability. At the same time corrupt government officials will try to 
perpetuate their rent seeking activities by reducing the likelihood of losing power.   
 
3. Some Empirical Evidence 
 
Traditionally the literature that analyzes the effect of foreign aid on development has used official 
development assistance (ODA) data. ODA measures aid flows that arrive to the recipient country in 
a given year, irrespective of what part, if any, has to be repaid. Data are in current US dollars.
5 
Following Burnside and Dollar (2000) we use the IMF's Import Unit Value index to transform data 
in constant dollars and to purchasing power parity.6 Table 1 shows the twenty most aid dependent 
countries in the world. The numbers indicate the average share of aid to GDP over the 1970 – 1999 
period. Comoros received around 16%, Guinea-Bissau near 14%, and Mauritania more than 12%. 
None of these countries have oil resources.  
 
The share of primary exports from oil over GDP i s the variable most widely used as a proxy for 
natural resource dependence. But the data are missing in many developing countries, especially 
during years of civil conflict. An alternative measure of rents from oil is the barrel production per 
day and the price per barrel, available from British Petroleum. Prices are in current dollars and are 
converted into constant dollars using  the IMF's Import Unit Value index, as in the case of aid. 
Table 1 shows the twenty most oil-revenue dependent countries in the world. Kuwait tops the list. 
During 1973-1999, the rents from oil in Kuwait represent 49% of GDP. Saudi Arabia (48%) and 
Gabon (44%) are close behind. Oil producers seldom receive aid. The exceptions are Papua New 
Guinea, Congo, Rep., Cameroon, Egypt, Angola and Gabon.  
                                                  
5 Whether aid should be adjusted for purchasing power parity depends on whether the funds are spent on 
tradable or non-tradable goods. In practice donor money is spent on both so there is equal justification for 
adjusting or not adjusting. We use PPP-adjusted aid but find that our results are robust to the use of non-
adjusted aid.  
6 The Unit Value Import index (UVI) is the ratio between the Import Unit values and import prices. In order 
to have the aid data in constant dollars and in purchasing power parity we multiply by the Unit Value Import 
Index of 1985 for the world and then divide by the UVI index for the world of the current year. Finally, we 
divide the aid value by real GDP in constant 1985 prices using the Penn World Tables 5.6.   6 
 
There are two sources of data on political institutions. One is the Polity IV project. Scales of 
democracy are created through the aggregation of authority characteristics, the procedure for 
recruitment of chief executives, and the centralization of government structure.
7 The variable 
democracy ranges from 0 to 10. For example in 1999, Sudan, China and Uganda were countries 
with 0 level of democracy, while Malaysia was coded with an intermediate level of 4. Uruguay and 
Mauritius are examples  of full democracy, scoring at 10. Several examples help explain its 
construction. In Fiji, a 1987 military coup led by Stivenu Rabuka installed a government ruled by 
indigenous Melanesians. The democracy score dropped from 9 to 0. In Niger, a 1996 coup led by 
Colonel Mainassara ousted the elected government. The democracy score dropped from 8 to 0. In 
Thailand, student protests in 1992 forced the military to call depoliticize and call elections. 
Thailand’s democracy score went from 1 to 8. In Indonesia, the authoritarian regime of General 
Suharto collapsed in 1998 and new elections were called the following year. Indonesia’s democracy 
score jumped from 0 to 8.  
 
The other source of information is the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) constructed by 
Keefer et al. (2001), which provides information after 1975. The variable Checks captures the 
number of decision makers whose agreement is necessary before policies can be changed.
8 It takes 
values from 1 to 9 in our sample, 1 being countries with the lowest number of key decision makers. 
For example in 1999 Liberia, Nigeria, Haiti and Honduras scored 1 or 2 of checks and balances.  
Madagascar, Kenya,  Cameroon, Sierra Leone and Brazil had a score of 3, and Mexico, Ecuador, 
Nepal, Thailand  4 or 5. The construction of the variable is based on legislative and executive 
indices of electoral competitiveness and the number of the parties in the government coalition. 
Countries with multiple decision makers may offer greater protection of individuals and minorities 
from arbitrary government action. The lower the value of the variable, the higher the level of 
political exclusion.  We alternatively use the measures of legislative and executive electoral 
competitiveness, also in DPI, and find that quantitatively similar results (not reported) are obtained 
when using these variables.  
                                                  
7 Freedom House also has a democracy variable. It is c ruder, yet the correlation between the Polity and 
Freedom House variables during our sample period is 0.88. 
8 Another relevant set of variables on judicial checks and balances are developed in La Porta et al. 
(forthcoming). Unfortunately, their 71-country sample covers less than half of the countries here.    7 
 
The two variables previously discussed are linked. Countries that become more democratic usually 
display an increase in checks and balances on the government. Among highly democratic countries, 
checks and balances’ increases are not associated with changes in democracy.  
 
We have a sample of 108 recipient countries. Among them 43 are sub-Saharan African countries, 
29 from Latin America, and 13 from Asia. With these data in hand, we analyze what happens in the 
countries that receive the largest amount of aid. Table 2 ranks the 10 countries that receive the 
largest and least amount of aid conditional on having any institutional change during that 5-years 
period. On average, aid-dependent countries suffer a 2 points reduction in democracy. In contrast, 
the countries least dependent on aid suffer a 0.9 points reduction in democracy. These results 
suggest a positive correlation between aid and reduction in the democratic level of countries. 
   
African countries are the largest recipients of foreign aid. In addition they are among the least 
democratic. Therefore it seems reasonable to look at the time series behavior of foreign aid and the 
level of democracy among these countries. Figure 1 shows a negative relationship between the 
annual average of aid over GDP and the level of democracy. This result is robust to calculating the 
average weighted by population (not shown). Figure 2 shows the partial correlation between aid 
and the change in democracy between 1960 and 1999 for the whole sample. The slope of this 
relationship is negative. Similar correlations are found when plotting the changes in checks and 
balances against aid flows.    
 
In figure 3 and figure 4 we perform the same exercise but looking at oil instead of ODA. Figure 3 
shows the negative relationship between the annual average of oil over GDP and the level of 
democracy. This result is also robust to calculating the average weighted by population (not 
shown). Figure 4 shows the partial correlation between oil and the change of democracy between 




   8 
4. Estimation 
 
The descriptive statistics in the previous section indicate a negative correlation between changes in 
the stock of foreign aid and improvements in political institutions. Next, we investigate 
econometrically whether the changes in the stock of foreign aid and the rents from oil have an 
effect on the change of political institutions. The dependent variable we analyze is the change of 
institutions. In the empirical analysis we use a sample of recipient countries and data of two 
different periods: 1960 to 1999 when using the Polity IV database and 1977 to 1999 when using the 
DPI database.  
 
We consider the several explanatory variables besides foreign aid and oil. Sudden changes in the 
terms of trade are shocks that can lead to social unrest and political instability. This effect is related 
to the reduced ability of corrupt governments to benefit from exports of natural resources.  
Negative shocks pressure governments to reduce democracy and checks and balances. On the other 
hand positive shocks imply an increase in the size of rents that can be appropriated. Finally, we 




The literature on the determinants of democracy usually includes income as a determinant of 
democracy level. Our specification does not follow the literature since recent empirical work by 
Knack (2004) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) shows that the association falls out 
once you control for factors that simultaneously affect income and democracy. We confirm this 
using our data. Another often-used control variable is primary school enrollment. Human capital is 
shown to be an important determinant of institutions that affect economic growth (Glaeser et al, 
forthcoming). In alternative specifications, we find that our results are robust to the inclusion of  
primary school enrollment. Finally, the legal origin of a country has been found to be an important 
determinant of institutional development. In particular, the legal origin of a country influences the 
ability of a political or economic system to change. Our results are robust to the inclusion of this 
variable (not reported).  
                                                  
9  Knack (2001) analyzes the effect of aid on the change on the ICRG index, but using a different 
specification.    9 
 
As aid may flow to countries whose institutions are getting worse, we need an instrument for 
foreign aid. We follow Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly et al. (2003) and use the logarithm 
of initial income, the logarithm of population and a group of variables that captures donors 
“strategic interests” – represented by dummy variables for sub-Saharan Africa, the Franc Zone, 
Egypt, and Central American countries10. Therefore our specification is the following: 
 
it it it it it it it INST SHOCKS SHOCKS OIL aid INST e b b b b b b + + + + - + + + = D -1 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) (  
 
it z i it p it y it z p y aid z g f g + + + = - - ' 1 1  
where  it INST D  is the change on institutions,  aid  is a measure of the change in the stock of aid 
received by a country measured as the net ODA (flow) over GDP,  OIL  is the size of rents of oil 
over GDP, SHOCKS(.) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of trade 
and INST is the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period
11. The excluded 
instruments are initial income in the previous period (y), the logarithm of population in the previous 
period (p) and the group of variables that capture donors “strategic interests” (z). 
 
Knack (2004) and Bräutigam and Knack (2004) have also recently studied the determinants of 
changes in institutions and the quality of democracy. Our study is different in many respects. First, 
these studies consider a different sample period from ours. Knack (2004) considers a cross section 
of changes of the Freedom House index from 1975 to 2000. Bräutigam and Knack (2004) work 
with a cross section of African countries from 1982 to 1997. In addition our basic result is obtained 
from a panel of 5 years periods instead of a single cross-section. Second, we only include in the 
specification sources of a sudden windfall of resources (aid, oil and shocks to the terms of trade) 
that may generate an institutional change in order to increase the chances of the groups in power to 
control these resources. Knack (2004) includes aid together with income and other indicators of the 
level of development of a country (for instance illiteracy).  These variables are included in levels 
                                                  
10 In their study of the effect of foreign aid on growth Burnside and Dollar (2000) also include as additional 
instruments the ratio of arms imports over imports and a policy index. 
11 The specification can be interpreted as regressing changes on changes. Aid is the net change in the stock 
of foreign aid over GDP; Oil is the annual rents from oil over GDP and the shocks are, by definition, 
changes in the levels.     10 
and first differences but turn out to be not significantly different from 0.
12  Third, our source for the 
data on foreign aid is also different. We use ODA from the OECD and we transform it into constant 
dollars and PPP, following Burnside and Dollar, and we do the ratio over real GDP in constant 
1985 prices using Penn World Tables. Knack (2004) uses aid over GDP f rom the World 
Development Indicators. Moreover, we compare the effect of ODA with the effect of rents from oil 
using the production and price information from British petroleum. Finally, the instruments are not 
the same as the ones used in Knack (2004). 
 
We present the results using IV estimation. The F test for excluded instruments is  large ( F= 47.07) 
and above usual thresholds which implies that the instruments are not weak. The same conclusion 
can be drawn from the partial R
2 statistic
13 (0.41). The column 1 in table 4 presents the results of 
the IV estimation. Notice that it is quite likely that there is intra-group correlation. Under this 
circumstance IV estimators are still consistent but the usual standard deviation will not be 
consistent.  For this reason in column 1 we present the z -statistics obtained using a cluster-robust 
standard deviation. The results show that foreign aid and rents of oil have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the changes of the democratic stance of a country.  The coefficient 
on the past level of democracy is negative and significantly different from 0. The Durbin test 
rejects the hypothesis that foreign aid is exogenous and, therefore, IV estimation is recommended.  
This result is different from the findings in Burnside and Dollar (2000) who find foreign aid to be 
exogenous in their set up14. Finally Sargan’s test of over-identification shows that the chosen 
instruments are appropriate. 
 
Column 1 in table 4 indicates that the more aid a country received the worse its political institutions 
get
15. If the average amount of aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of five years 
reaches the 75
th percentile then the index of democracy is reduced by more than half a point (0.60). 
By contrast, if aid over GDP  reaches the 25
th percentile then the reduction in the index of 
                                                  
12 We avoid using income as an explanatory variable because most of its content is not related with windfall 
of resources that could be easily expropriated. If we include income per capita as an additional regressor it is 
insignificantly different from 0 as in Knack (2004). 
13 Shea (1997). 
14 The found that foreign aid was endogenous only in the sample of lower-income countries. 
15 We performed the same analysis using the mean of aid flows of the previous five years. The results are 
robust when using this specification.   11 
democracy is a modest 0.07  points. Countries in the 75
th percentile are, for example, Bolivia, Chad, 
Senegal, Central African Republic and Haiti. Countries in the 25
th percentile are, for example, 
Chile, Turkey, Ecuador and Malaysia.  The effect of oil revenues is smaller. If the average oil 
revenues over GDP over a period of five years reaches the 75
th percentile then the index of 
democracy is reduced by 0.02 points. If it reaches the 25th percentile then the reduction in 
democracy is zero. 
 
However, IV estimators under heteroskedasticity may not be efficient. For this reason column 2 
presents the results of the estimation using the generalized method of moments (GMM). The 
estimators are similar to the ones shown in column 1: foreign aid and rents of oil have a negative 
and significant coefficient while the shocks to the terms of trade have an insignificant effect. The J 
test of over-identification cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments satisfy the 
orthogonality conditions. We can also calculate a GMM estimator assuming the presence of 
arbitrary intra-cluster correlation (column 3). The results are also similar to the ones reported in 
column 1. In addition the J test confirms that the instruments pass the test of over-identification. 
There are two particular instruments (population and GDP per capita) that we should consider 
specially. For this reason the last rows of column 3 contains the test for the validity of these two 
instruments. In both cases the test of the difference of J shows that the orthogonality conditions 
generated by those instruments are valid. 
 
Another issue that may be important is the inclusion in the regression of population and GDP per 
capita. The population of a country is a measure of the capacity of the government to tax. Mulligan 
and Shleifer (2003) show that the size of the population is an important determinant of whether and 
how many activities are regulated. This effect may have an influence on the quality of democratic 
institutions. We think that only resources that are easy to expropriate should be included in the 
regression. But income and population are bad proxies since tax revenue in developing countries is  
low. In addition the inclusion of the initial level of democracy seems to be enough to proxy the 
initial level of development. 
 
Despite these arguments we analyze in table 5 the robustness of the previous results to considering 
these variables as instruments included in the main regression. Columns 1 and 2 of table 5 report   12 
the results of the IV estimator with cluster robust standard deviations. In both cases the coefficients 
for foreign aid and rents of oil are negative and statistically significant while the included 
instrument (population and G DP per capita) turn out to be insignificant. The test rejects the 
exogeneity of foreign aid. In addition the tests of over-identification cannot reject the exogeneity of 
the excluded instruments. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the GMM estimation. T he 
parameter estimates are similar to the ones obtained using the IV estimator. The estimates in 
column 4 indicates that if the average amount of aid over GDP that a country receives over a period 
of five years reaches the 75
th percentile then the index of democracy is reduced by almost one point 
(0.95). By contrast, if aid over GDP reaches the 25
th percentile then the reduction in the index of 
democracy is only 0.11 points. 
 
When population is included in the regression (columns 2 and 4 of table 5) the estimated coefficient 
on foreign aid is larger than the ones in table 4. The opposite happens when income per capita 
becomes an included exogenous variable in the regression. The estimates in table 3 are in between. 
The largest difference in the estimated parameters in columns 1 and 2 versus 3 and 4 is associated 
with the new instruments. However, the parameters of these regressors are statistically insignificant 
in all the estimations. The J test confirms the validity of the excluded instruments in columns 3 and 
4 while the differences of J test point out to the exogeneity of population and GDP per capita. 
Therefore, population and GDP per capita have a role to play as excluded instruments but they do 
not seem to belong to the main regression. 
 
To test the robustness of the findings with five-year periods, table 6 presents the results of different 
estimation procedures using a cross section of countries for the period 1960-99. We  first used IV 
regression using as instruments the ones consider previously. The results show that foreign aid has 
a negative effect on democracy which is much stronger than the effect of the rents of oil. The 
specification test show that the F statistic for the excluded instruments is over the usual threshold 
(F=10). The over-identification test points out that the instruments are valid at the usual level of 
significance. However, the Durbin test indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
foreign aid is exogenous. Therefore we present the estimation using OLS and ordered p robit. As in 
previous tables, foreign aid, rents of oil and the initial level of democracy have a negative and   13 
significant coefficient. Column 2 presents the estimation of an ordered probit specification. As in 
the OLS case foreign aid and the rents of oil have a negative and significant coefficient.  
 
The effect of aid over GDP in the long run is large:  if the average amount of aid over GDP is 1.9% 
over the period, then the recipient country will go from the average level of democracy in recipient 
countries in the initial year to a total absence of democracy. The effect of oil in the long-run is far 
smaller: if the average amount of oil revenue over GDP is 12.2% over the period, then the recipient 
country will go from the average level of democracy of the recipient countries in the initial year to 
a total absence of democracy.
16    
 
Our sample includes countries like Singapore, which started poor but grew rich by the end of the 
sample period. We test whether the results are robust if these countries are left out. We follow the 
standard World Bank definition for upper middle-income countries, i.e., countries with annual 
income per capita larger than $2,935 in 2001. All results are robust if we exclude these countries 
from the analysis. We also test whether our results are robust to the exclusion of a small number of 
influential observations. In particular, we re-run the regressions when deleting the top 1% and 5% 
of observations in terms of the main explanatory variable – foreign aid or oil revenues. The effect 
remains similar. For example, re-running equation 1 in Table 5 without the top 5% observations 
yields a coefficient of –0.22 and t-statistics of 3.38, as compared to –0.16 and 3.29, respectively. 
    
We do the same analysis using checks and balances from DPI instead of democracy from Polity IV, 
for the 5 -years period (table 7) and cross-section of countries (table 8). In the five-years period the 
F test for excluded instruments is large, (F(6,448)=47.07). Moreover, the Durbin test shown in table 
7 rejects the hypothesis that foreign aid is exogenous, and therefore IV estimation is recommended, 
as when using democracy data. In column 1 of table 7 we present the results using IV estimation. 
As explained before it is likely that there is intra-group correlation, therefore we present the z-
statistics obtained using cluster-robust standard deviation. The results show that foreign aid has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on the changes on checks and balances of a country. 
                                                  
16 However,  the instrumental variables approach  does not take into account the fact that the democracy 
indicator cannot take values smaller than 0. Yet some countries that had a low democracy score in the initial 
year had a high proportion of oil over GDP, as shown in Table 1. 
   14 
However, the effect of rents of oil is not statistically significant. As before, initial level of 
institutional development, in this case of checks and balances, is negative and significantly 
different from zero. Finally Sargan’s test of over-identification shows that the chosen instruments 
seem to be appropriate.  
 
Given that IV results under heteroskedasticity will not be efficient, we present the results of the 
estimation using the generalized method of moments, column 2 of table 7. The results are similar: 
flows of aid have a negative and significant effect of the changes on checks and balances, and rents 
of oil are insignificant. The J test of over-identification cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments satisfy the orthogonality conditions.  In column 3 we present the results of the GMM 
estimations assuming the presence of arbitrary intra-cluster correlation. The results again are  
similar, and the J test of over-identification confirms that the instruments are valid.  
 
Table 8 presents the results using a cross-section of countries for the period 1977-99. Results of 
Durbin test for IV estimation in cross-section of countries indicates that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that foreign aid is exogenous, and IV estimation is not recommended. Therefore we 
present the results using OLS and ordered probit specification. As before, flows of foreign aid have 
a negative and significant effect on the change on checks and balances, while rents of oil do not 
have any effect on the change of checks and balances. 
             
5. Robustness 
 
We do several robustness tests to ensure that the results discussed before are not altered by 
reasonable changes in specification or the use of other proxy for institutional development. 
 
Since changes of institutions are regressed on lagged institutions, the previous estimation of the 
five year periods may be inconsistent because of the correlation between the individual specific 
effect and the lagged endogenous variable. In order to address this issue we use the Arellano Bond 
estimator. Table 9 present the results. In column 1 we use the change of democracy, and we include 
the usual excluded instruments for the estimation. The results show that flows of aid have a 
negative and significant effect on the change of democracy of a country, while rents of oil have no   15 
statistically significant effect
17. The Arellano and Bond method generates many valid instruments 
without the need to search for additional ones. Therefore in column 2 we present the results without 
our usual excluded instruments. Results as before indicate that flows of aid have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the change of democracy. The effect of rents of oil is not 
statistically significant. In column 3 and 4, we do the same analysis but using the change on checks 
and  balances. In column 3 we include our usual excluded instruments, and in column 4 we use the 
valid instrument generated by Arellano and Bond procedure. When using this instrument, the 
results indicate that aid has a statistically negative effect on the change in checks and balances.     
 
Second, we test the sensitivity of the results to the chosen time period. The negative effect of aid on 
changes in democracy maintains if the sample starts alternatively in 1965, 1970, or 1975 (not 
shown).  The size of the parameter is smaller than the one obtained for the whole sample but the 
statistical and economic significance are maintained. The coefficient on oil revenues is also 
statistically significant and negative as in previous tables. We also run the regressions by decade 
(four ten-years periods) and we cut the sample into two periods. Finally, we use only post-Cold 
War data (data in the last decade – 1989-1999). The results are robust to changing the period 
length. 
 
Third, we use alternative data on institutions. Using the democracy index from Freedom House and  
the composite index from  ICRG, as in Keefer and Knack (1999), we find near-identical results.  
  
Fourth, we test for sensitivity of the results conditional on working with the sample of countries 
that have had a change in the level of democracy in the previous period for the 5 years data or in 
the cross-section.  We perform the same analysis as before but considering only the countries, years 
and periods in which institutions changed. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 10. 
The rows indicate the frequency of the data (5-year panels or cross-section). In the cross-section, 
we include different starting years, 1960, 1965, 1970, and 1975. We use IV and standard errors 
corrected by clusters when using the 5-years specification, and OLS when using cross-section of 
countries specification. The columns indicate which institutional variable is used as the dependent 
                                                  
17 The standard errors in table 9 have been calculated using the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer 
(2005).   16 
variable. The numbers of the table are the coefficient of foreign aid and the t-statistic. The results 
indicate that democracy and checks and balances fall with increased aid flows.  
 
Fifth, we check whether results come from countries scoring below the average on democracy at 
the beginning of the period. We run the regressions for countries scoring above the average on 
democracy, and we find qualitatively the same results. This indicates that countries with good 
democratic institutions are not immune to the “curse of aid”.   
 
Finally, we test whether aid has a positive effect on economic institutions. As many aid programs 
are explicitly targeted on such improvements, a positive result may provide some solace to donors. 
Using various indicators from Djankov et al (2002, 2003) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
(2005), we find that higher aid flows affect adversely economic institutions as well. In particular, 
countries that have received more aid during the sample period have more burdensome procedures 
for new business start-ups, less efficient courts, and fewer protections of creditors at the end of the 
sample period. These results echo the examples in Easterly (2003b) of how enormous demands on 




Recently a United Nations proposal for a doubling in foreign aid in order to generate a “big push” 
in development has been put forward (UN, 2005). The results described in the previous literature 
suggest that more money will likely generate little growth. Instead, stronger incentives for rent 
seeking may reduce  the quality of democratic institutions and the checks and balances in the 
governments of recipient countries.  
 
Using data on over one hundred countries and for over forty years, this study quantifies the effects 
of aid on democracy. Being dependent on foreign aid seems to result in worsening democratic 
institutions. This effect is akin to the “curse of oil” effect established in previous work. We provide 
new evidence for the relative size of the curse of aid and the curse of oil on political institutions. 
The comparison is instructive as it highlights how little is known about the delivery of foreign aid, 
despite an estimated $2.3 trillion spent on aid in the second half of the 20
th century. The specific   17 
mechanism why foreign aid has a negative effect on political institutions needs to be further 
investigated.    18 
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coef = -.95957362, se = .20998279, t = -4.57
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coef = -.19697042, se = .06860294, t = -2.87
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 Table 1: The 20 most aid or oil-dependent countries 
 



















































Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Ecuador 
Papua New Guinea 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Cameroon 
Mexico 























Note: ODA over GDP is the average annual share of GDP during 1970-1999. Oil revenue over GDP is the 
average annual share of GDP during 1973-1999. 
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Table 2: Top and Bottom 10 Recipients of Aid and Changes in Institutions 
 
 
Country  Oda  Democracy lag  ?Democ 
Zambia, 1996  29.52  6  -3 
Comoros, 1999  14.30  5  -4 
Gambia, The, 1990  11.99  7  1 
Nicaragua, 1995  10.33  6  2 
Gambia, The, 1994  9.34  8  -8 
Lesotho, 1970  9.04  9  -9 
Botswana, 1971  8.89  7  2 
Madagascar, 1998  8.84  8  -1 
Jordan, 1992  8.05  1  1 
Mali, 1997  7.78  7  -1 
       
Venezuela, 1992  0.017  9  -1 
Venezuela, 1999  0.025  8  -1 
Argentina, 1976  0.025  6  -6 
Brazil, 1985  0.031  2  5 
Argentina, 1999  0.032  7  1 
Mexico, 1988  0.034  1  1 
Mexico, 1997  0.041  4  2 
Brazil, 1988  0.043  7  1 
Trini. Tobago, 1984  0.044  8  1 
Malaysia, 1995  0.044  5  -1 
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Table 3: Variables 
 
 
Oda: Share of ODA over GDP. ODA comes from OECD database. ODA is converted to 1985 
dollars with World Import Unit Value index from IMF 2002, series 75. GDP comes from PWT5.6.  
We update GDP using GDNGD. 
 
Oil: Share of rents from oil over GDP. Rents from oil comes from British Petroleum database. We 
compute barrels per years and multiply by the barrel price. Rents of oil are concerted to 1985 
dollars with World Import Unit Value index from IMF 2002, series75. GDP comes from PWT5.6. 
We update GDP using GDNGD. 
 
Lpop: log of the population at the beginning of the period from the Penn World Tables 5.6. 
Updated with the data of the Global Development Network Growth Database.  
 
Sh_tot_neg: mean absolute value of the negative growth rate of the terms of trade over a five-years 
period. Terms of trade shows the national accounts exports price index divided by the imports price 
index, with 1995 equal to 100. Data comes from GDF, The World Bank.  
 
Sh_tot_pos : mean value of the positive growth rate of the terms of trade over a five-years period. 
Terms of trade shows the national accounts exports price index divided by the imports price index, 
with 1995 equal to 100. Data comes from GDF, The world Bank.  
 
?Democ: Change in the degree of democracy between period t and t-1. Democracy variable comes 
from Polity IV database.  
 
Democ(t-1): Degree of democraticy at the beginning of the period.  
 
?Checks: Checks at period t minus checks at t-1. The variable checks and balances comes from 
Database of Political Institutions 2002.  
 




Table 4: 2SLS (5-year periods)  
Endogenous variable: ?Democ 
 
  IV 
(cluster 
robust) 




  (1)  (2)  (3)   









































     




     















N  459  459  459   
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Table 5: Robustness to the inclusion of excluded instruments  
2SLS (5-year periods)  
Endogenous variable: ?Democ 
 
 













  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   













































Lgdp (t-1)  0.17 
(1.13) 
  0.13 
(0.94) 
   
Lpop (t-1)    -0.14 
(-1.48) 












     








     












N  459  459  459  459   
           
Note: The subindex t-1 refers to the previous five-years period. 
 




Table 6: Cross section (1960-99)  
Endogenous variable: ?Democ 
 
  OLS  Ord. 
Prob 
  (1)  (3) 




















     
R
2  0.54  0.1493 
N  57  57 
     
 





Table 7: 2SLS (5-year periods)  
Endogenous variable: ?checks 
 
  IV 
(cluster 
robust) 




  (1)  (2)  (3)   









































     





     











dif J (Lgdp)      ?2(1)=0.33 
p=0.56 
 
N  356  356  356   
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Table 8: Cross section (1977-99)  
Endogenous variable: ?Checks 
 
  OLS  Ord. 
Prob 
  (2)  (3) 




















     
R
2  0.1331  0.1391 
N  73  73 
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Table 9: Arellano Bond (5-year periods)  
Endogenous variable: ?Democ ?Checks 
 
  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 






  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 




































   




         








         






















R2         
N  365  372  215  219 
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Table 10: Robust analysis: 2sls estimation. 
 
  ?Democ  ?Checks 
 







Cross6099 (OLS)  -0.79 
(-4.60) 
 
Cross6599 (OLS)  -0.79 
(-4.25) 
 
Cross7099 (OLS)  -0.72 
(-4.07) 
 
Cross7599 (OLS)  -0.45 
(-3.54) 
 
Cross7799 (OLS)    -0.14 
(-1.49) 
  
 
 
 
 